One of the ṣaḥābīs of Prophet Muḥammad is ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd from the Ṭāʾif tribe of Thaqīf. He belongs to the Ahlâf part of the Thaqīf tribe and he is the ruler of this part. ʿUrwa’s ancestry is known without any controversy until Kasî (Thaqīf). According to a narrative his epithet was Abū Yaʿfur and another of his epithet was Abū Masʿūd. Father of ʿUrwa an important person too. He is one of the leaders of his tribe and he commanded (...) his part (Aḥlāf) in wars of Fijār. Mother of ʿUrwa is Subay’a bt. ʿAbd Shams from Banū Umayya. In this way ʿUrwa has kinship both with Banū Umayya and Prophet Muḥammad. So ʿUrwa has a very important position because of his lineage, his mother and father. Thefore, his connections with Mecca and Quraysh strengthens his position. In our sources there is no information about his dates of birth and death. It is likely to be over middle age when he became a muslim, considering that he was the leader of his tribe and his son become a muslim after he died. There is too little information about weddings of ʿUrwa. According to narratives, he had ten wives before becoming Muslim. After becoming a Muslim Prophet Muḥammad warned from him to prefer four out of ten wives. One of his four wives is the daughter of Abū Sufyān. Howev-er, there is no information about the names of his wives. Names of his sons: ʿĀṣim, Abū Murra, Abū Mulayḥ, Dāwūd, Hammām and Hishām and names of his daughters: Umm Saʿīd (married with Ḥaẓrat ʿAlī) and Ḥalīma. We could see he served as embassy before the treaty of Hudaybiyah. His embassy duty shows us the superiority of his position. Also, this embassy duty was very effective at peace negotiations. He mentioned kinship relations which connects about Mecca. He said that it could be beneficial to talk to Prophet Muḥammad himself. The Meccans mentioned about their trust in ʿUrwa. During the time of his embassy, he expressed that both sides should be away from war. In this context, he told the Meccans: The people around Prophet Muḥammad are very loyal to him and he told to Prophet Muḥammad: People around him could disintegrate easily. This mission shows us he is intelligent, respectable and had high persuasion skills. ʿUrwa, observed loyalty of ṣaḥābīs to Prophet Muḥammad. He confessed this loyalty can not be for any ruler. This observa-tion probably affected ʿUrwa’s conversion to Islam. Because of the conquest of Meccah and the events that followed, the people of Ṭāʾif were very worried. Because of this reason people of Ṭāʾif took part in the side of Hawāzin’s and they bat-tled with Muslims. In this time they sent ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd and Ghaylān b. Salama to the city of D̲j̲aras̲h̲ of Yemen, to learn about some war machines and techniques. Therefore they did not join wars of Hunayn and Ṭāʾif. Prophet Muḥammad ended the siege of Ṭāʾif and went to Medina. Meanwhile, ʿUrwa and his friend returned from Yemen. According to narratives when the Prophet Muḥammad returned Medina or he was way in Medina ʿUrwa visited him and became Muslim. Some people tell about the date of ʿUrwa’s being Muslim at before or after Abū Bakr’s emirate of Hadj. However, when the narrations are examined, it can be said he became Muslim after four or five months from Prophet’s siege of Ṭāʾif and before three or four months from Tabūk expedition of Rabīʿ al-awwal or “Rabīʿ al-ākhir” (July or August) in the year 9/630. As for the conversion of ʿUrwa, basic sources report that “Allah, inspired Islam to the heart of ʿUrwa and he changed his situation. He went to the Messenger of Allah and he became Muslim.” They do not give a specific reason. But after this period the narratives tell the reason for ʿUrwa’s becoming a Muslim as due to an experience he had while travelling to Najrān for trade. In this travel, two mysterious young girls and the priest in Najrān said the last prophet came and ʿUrwa must be subject to him and ʿUrwa became Muslim after he returned. But this narrative is prob-lematic with regard to evidence and text. After being Muslim, ʿUrwa wanted permission from the Prophet to invite his tribe to accept Islam. The prophet did not want to accept this at first. Because the people of Ṭāʾif had an arro-gant stance against Islam, and he said that the people of Thaqīf could kill ʿUrwa. Eventually ʿUrwa went to his hometown with permission of Prophet and invited people to Islam and they did not accept this invitation and cursed ʿUrwa. The next morning ʿUrwa read adhan of fajr and people of Ṭāʾif killed him. ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd was likened to Prophet Jesus by the Prophet Muḥammad. It is generally accept-ed that ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd el-Thaqafī is “one of the biggest from two cities” expressed in sūra Zukhruf. Only two weak narrations were reported of Urwa who could live as a Muslim for a few days and was matyred by his tribe. (shrink)

The present article studies the self-cremation of Dabba Mallaputta, based on a translation of the Sa?yukta-?gama parallel to two discourses in the Ud?na that record this event.

Taftāzānī, Masʻūd ibn ʻUmar, 1322-1389?; criticiam and intepretation; Islamic law; early works.

Le 27 avril 1938, Edmund HUSSERL, l'initiateur et principal representant du courant phenomenologique dans la philosophie contemporaine, mourut a Fribourg en Brisgau, age de pres de quatre-vingts ans. Depuis la parution de ses Logische Untersuchungen en 190~ 1901, le monde philosophique international avait suivi, avec UD interet toujours croissant, les exposes successifs et de plus en plus approfondis, que le maUre fribourgeois publiait sur les prin~ cipes de sa methode, dite pMnomenologique, sur les applications concretes de celle-ci aux problemes philosophiques (...) les plus divers, ainsi que sur la phenomenologie comme systeme philo­ sophique autonome et pour ainsi dire "autarchique". Ces publi­ cations, relativement peu nombreuses, mais fort remarquees des leur parution, furent etudiees avec le plus grand soin par les representants les plus autorises des differents courants de la pensee contemporaine. Les critiques, il va sans dire, ne manquerent point. On attira l'attention sur le caractere plutöt programmatique de ces etudes, sur la terminologie fort neuve, quelque peu arbitraire, parfois meme deroutante, dont se servait l'auteur, sur son pen­ chant prononce pour des distinctions subtiles et pour des defini­ tions minutieuses a l'exces, sur la difficulte de son style et les complications parfois inutiles de son expose, enfin et surtout -­ au moins depuis 1913 - sur le caractere audacieux de sa theorie de la reduction, presentee par lui avec une insistance toute par­ ticuliere comme le fondement dernier et indispensable de toute phenomenologie presente ou future. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Il y a dans la violence que doivent aujourd’hui affronter nos sociétés une dimension propre à la langue. Quiconque a fait l’apprentissage de l’éducation doit reconnaître au creux de sa propre expérience la manière dont la langue façonne, modèle, impose. Quant au XXe siècle, il s’est chargé de nous montrer comment la langue peut condamner à une mort certaine. C’est cette dimension propre au langage que se propose d’explorer le philosophe Marc Crépon, convaincu que le nœud de toute violence tient (...) d’abord dans la langue et l’usage que nous en avons. S’il chemine avec Kafka, Lévinas, Singer ou Derrida, ce n’est pas seulement parce que chacun d’entre eux s’est en son temps insurgé contre les détournements de la langue, préludes aux plus grands crimes commis contre l’humanité, constituant un réservoir d’expériences, pour prévenir les prochains massacres. C’est aussi parce que leur œuvre affirme la vocation de l’écriture : celle qui fait de la littérature et de la philosophie l’arme ultime pour démasquer, au coeur de la langue, la violence et la haine dont celle-ci est porteuse. Affirmer la vocation de l’écriture, c’est retourner la langue contre elle-même, désamorcer ses potentialités meurtrières en l’ouvrant à l’échange, à la responsabilité, à l’humanité, quand celle-ci se fixe autrui et le monde comme buts. Normalien, agrégé de philosophie, Marc Crépon est directeur de recherches au CNRS et directeur du département de philosophie à l’École normale supérieure. Il a notamment publiéLe Consentement meurtrier. (shrink)

L’article explore les différentes modalités du lien chez Rousseau, social, civil, politique, selon les principaux axes de sa pensée. On part de la critique de la sociabilité des Lumières conduite dans le Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes pour confronter le remède politique apporté dans le Contrat social à l’analyse qui est menée dans l’Émile autour de « l’homme abstrait » cultivant sa capacité d’attachement. Peut ainsi émerger la généalogie des liens à partir des relations (...) de besoin. En contrepoint de la condamnation de la dépendance réciproque, une cartographie des notions de liaison, rapport, relation, nœud et ressort permet de donner tout son sens à la définition positive de l’homme comme « être relatif ». (shrink)

Le temps réel nous afflige, inaugurant traumatiquement le tragique de la perte irréversible de la présence. La philosophie, jusqu'à J. Derrida inclus, en a su quelque chose, mais a occulté ce savoir en remettant dans le sujet, comme intentionnalité et auto-affection, ce qui vient du dehors l'arracher à lui-même. Freud en a su quelque chose, mais a relégué ce savoir dans la sphère des pensées privées, se laissant par ailleurs fasciner par la monstrueuse et merveilleuse atemporalité que lui présentait son (...) objet, l'inconscient. Ce que Lacan a confirmé, l'identifiant à la structure du signifiant. Sa pratique clinique lui a pourtant aussi inspiré, à de rares mais précieux moments, une écoute psychanalytique du temps sur laquelle on a ici mis l'accent. Restait alors à marquer la juste place de la préoccupation ontologique dans un champ psychique commandé d'abord par la pulsion et le narcissisme. Pulsion, narcissisme, souci de l'être et du néant : c'est ce nœud qui fait sens, ce que confortent deux études cliniques : celle de la mise en œuvre du temps continu androgynique chez Wagner, et celle de la philosophie du devenir créateur chez Nietzsche. (shrink)

Romantikken er en sammensat kulturhistorisk og andshistorisk stromning, som brod frem i slutningen af 1700-tallet og kulminerede i den forste tredjedel af 1800-tallet, men havde udlobere helt ind i det 20. arhundrede. Ud over at formulere et sAerligt verdenssyn, der abnede for en dyrkelse af folkelig fortid, for melankolsk livsforelse, dybe trAengsler, anelser, splittelse og higen efter helhed og harmoni og meget andet, var den karakteriseret ved en kritisk reaktion mod to af den tids stAerke stromninger: Den oplysningstid, som i (...) den romantiske kritik ofte blev fremstillet som en kold, reduktionistisk, materialistisk rationalisme, og den endnu koldere materialistiske og rationalistiske modernitet. En ubehagelig fremtid, som romantikerne sa trAenge sig pa med den fremvoksende industrialisering.Givet er det, at romantikkens kosmologi og filosofi blev formuleret blandt tyske intellektuelle i sidste halvdel af 1700-tallet, og at stromningen i forskellig rytme og med varierende styrke spredte sig ud over Europa. Gennemslaget inden for faglige, videnskabelige og kunstneriske omrader varierede dog meget, og pavirkningen af andslivet var hojst forskellig fra land til land. Denne bogs mere end 40 artikler - alle skrevet af forskere pa det nye, store Aarhus Universitet - spreder sig derfor over hele perioden mellem sidste kvartal af 1700-tallet og begyndelsen af 1900-tallet og omhandler alt fra forskning i Frankenstein og Aedle vilde over nationalisme og gymnastik til Florence Nightingale og onde hekse. (shrink)

Si la science et la religion tentent de répondre à la question de l’origine de la vie, ni l’une ni l’autre ne s’interrogent vraiment sur sa nature. Certes, la vie est bien cet ensemble de mécanismes étudiés par les biologistes mais c’est aussi et avant tout un phénomène à part entière. Les sciences biologiques expliquent la vie en se référant à la théorie de l’évolution, à l’ADN et au rôle des protéines mais restent à l’extérieur de la vie proprement dite. (...) La vie ne se réduit donc ni à l’objet décrit par les biologistes ni à l’esprit invoqué par les religieux. Découvrir le phénomène vital, c’est comprendre comment l’externe s’articule à l’interne, le corps à l’âme, le biologique au psychique, le conscient à l’inconscient. Ce livre retrace les moments du nœud vital en prenant appui sur les sciences biologiques mais aussi sur celles de la conscience telles que la philosophie, la psychanalyse ou la phénoménologie, et révèle ainsi ce que l’on a coutume d’appeler la complexité de la vie. (shrink)

Résumé L’identification de l’étendue de l’appareil psychique et sa temporalité, initiée par Freud avec ses deux topiques, a été complétée par le recours de Lacan à la topologie des surfaces et des nœuds. Les réseaux en deux dimensions des signifiants se combinent avec une temporalité ternaire pour déterminer le sujet de l’inconscient, divisé telle la coupure d’une bande de Moebius. À ce sujet, sans substance, il manque l’Un pour le désigner ; l’objet cause de désir et le nom propre peuvent (...) y suppléer. (shrink)

En tolkning af “Sein und Zeit” (herefter SuZ) kræver en afklaring af værensspørgsmålets rolle i værket, thi holdningen hertil bestemmer vurderingen af de mange enkeltanalyser, der indgår deri. Essayets tese er, at værensspørgsmålet er bærende i hele SuZ – hvilket ikke er så indlysende, som det måske synes. En række tolkninger har søgt at vise, at værensspørgsmålet er et pseudo-spørgsmål, der bør glemmes, men at de enkelte analyser i SuZ i sig selv er interessante . Andre tolkninger går ud fra, (...) at værensspørgsmålet selv aldrig bliver stillet i SuZ, men at der kun foretages en analyse af Dasein . Derfor bliver det et mål at vise, at de to hovedopgaver i SuZ, Daseinsanalysen og destruktionen af ontologiens historie, ikke er to hinanden uafhængige momenter, der hver især skal forberede grunden ud fra hvilken værensspørgsmålet skal stilles, men derimod er selve udfoldelsen af værensspørgsmålet. (shrink)

Dans son livre d’anthropologie esthétique sur L’art chorégraphique occidental, une fabrique du féminin, inspiré de sa thèse soutenue en 2005 à l’Université de Toulouse 2, Virginie Valentin propose d’étudier le « nœud entre émotion esthétique et danse classique » (p. 11) qui donnerait aujourd’hui aux jeunes filles françaises l’envie de pratiquer le ballet. Croisant entretiens de danseuses professionnelles et amatrices sur leurs expériences de l’apprentissage du ballet, avec une analyse littéra...

La plupart des romans et des nouvelles de Murakami traitent du rapport à l’existence et de la construction de l’individu. Le corps, en conséquence, est alors mis en question, en tant que moyen d’accès au monde et comme manifestions de l’individu. Ceci entre particulièrement en résonance avec la culture japonaise en raison de sa propension à considérer l’individu comme particule du groupe. Par ailleurs, une question en particulier est suggérée par Murakami : le lien entre corps et esprit. La corporéité (...) défend alors son existence propre, sans contredire la volonté, mais pour parvenir à communiquer avec autrui et pour accéder à une forme d’universel. Dislocation entre imaginaire et réalité, conflits intimes tout autant que d’inspiration mythologique, sont les nœuds des romans étudiés : Kafka sur le rivage, La Fin des temps, L’Éléphant s’évapore. Les romans de Murakami imposent aux lecteurs d’envisager la corporéité comme un carrefour entre croyances mystique, désir et mémoire. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

The narration of tashahhud being a conversation between Allah, the Prophet and the angels is quite common among people. This article examines the authenticity of this narration and questions whether it has an informative value. In this context, the research undertaken in Hadith, Siyar, Tafsīr and Fiqh sources resulted that the narration was not stated in the hadith books -with sanad (the chain of narrators) or without sanad. The first and only summary version of the script was included in the (...) commentary of Thaʿlebī (d. 427/1035), which has very problematic sanads. The first narration without sanad but having a full text (matn) was narrated by Qurṭubī (d. 671/1273). It appears that various commentators of hadith, fuqahāʾ (expert in Islamic jurisprudence), mufassirs (commentators on the Qur’ān) and historians followed Thaʿlabî and Qurṭubī by narrating from them. In fact, these group of scholars did not specify a sanad for the narration but they usually used tamrīd forms (a form which shows that the hadith is weak or deficient), which suggests that they also did not convinced that the narrarion was makbūl (accepted). On the other hand, the fact that this narration did not accompany authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) hadiths on the emergence of tashahhud narrated by hadith scholars, such as Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, Nasāʾī and Ibn Mājah, which also indicates another problem with this narration. Summary: The narration on the emergence of the prophetic prayer that is called tashahhud in the fiqh literature as it includes the word shahadah (testimony) and known as “al-tahiyyat” and “tahiyyat” is constantly transmitted among people. According to this narration, the Prophet (pbuh) praised Allāh by saying “al-taḥiyyātu lillāhi wa-al-salawātu wa-al-ṭayyibāt” on the night of Miʿrāj when he met Allāh. Our Lord responded to him by saying “al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatullāhi wa-barakātuhu”. The honorable Prophet also included his ummah in this prayer by saying “al-salāmu ʿalayna wa-ʿalā ʿibād Allāh al-ṣāliḥīn” and the Gabriel (and/or angel community) who witnessed this greeting said “ashhadu an lā illāha illallāh wa-ashhadu anna Muḥammadan ʿabduhu wa-rasūluhu.”This article examines the authenticty of the narration and whether it has an informative value. The findings of the research undertaken in hadith, siyar, tafsir and fiqh sources suggests that the narration was not included in any hadith books with sanad or without sanad. The first and only narration with sanad is found in Thaʿlabī’s tafsīr titled al-Kasfh wa-al-bayān. However, it is a summary version of the narration and its sanads are very problematic. In this tafsīr, Thaʿlabī combines two different chains of narrators in one text. The sanads of these two narrations combined by Thaʿlabī as follows:1. Sanad: Zuhrī → Ibn Salimah b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān → Jābir b. ʿAbdullāh → Prophet (pbuh).2. Sanad: Suddī → Muḥammad b. al-Sāib → Bāzān → Ibn ʿAbbās → Prophet (pbuh).The identity of Ibn Salimah mentioned in the first sanad is disputed. The rijāl (literally; men, refers to knowledge of men/narrators) scholars, such as Ibn Abī Ḥātim stated that he is a man whose memory is corrupted in his old age. In the second sanad there are three dhaʽīf (weak) narrators, namely Suddī, Muḥammad b. al-Sāib and Bāzān. Ibn Abī Ḥātim stated that some parts of Kalbī’s (Muḥammad b. al-Sāib) narration with ṭarīkh (synonym of sanad) of Bāzān from Ibn ʿAbbās was fabricated. Moreover, Thaʿlabī who narrated these two sanads in his tafsīr was accused of being conveying fabricated narrations in his books.As far as we can ascertain, Qurṭubī narrated the first narration of this story without sanad and without referring to a source. However, he narrated the full version of the text. Similarly this narration was also transmitted by Suhaylī and ʿAlī al-Qārī without sanad and a reference but they transmitted it by seperating into two slightly different texts. According to Suhaylī’s text in al-Ravḍ al-Unuf, angels stated “al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatallāhi wa-barakātuhu” not Allāh. According to ʿAlī al-Qārī’s text in Sharḥ al-Shifa, when Allāh Said “al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatallāhi wa-barakātuhu”, the Prophet (pbuh) responded by saying: “Allāhumma anta al-Salām wa-minka al-Salām wa-ilayka yarjiuʿ al-Salām, al-Salām alaynā wa-alā ibād Allāh al-sālihīn.” It is clear that there are disputes about the contents of some sentences as well as their subjects in the text of Tashahhud’s narration.The full text and summary versions of this narrarion can be found in tafsīr books, such as Rāzī's Mafātiḥ al-ghayb, Samarqandī's Baḥr al-ʿulūm and Bursavī's Rūḥ al-bayān; in fiqh books, such as Bābartī's al-ʿInâyah, Ḥaddād's al-Javharah al-nayyirah, ʿAynī’s al-Bināyah, Molla Khusraw’s Durar al-ḥukkām, Jamal’s Futūḥāt al-Wahhāb and Bujayramī’s al-Tajrīd; and in various hadith commentaries and in some siyar books. The authors of these books did not mention sanads of their narrations and they usually used tamrīd forms. This suggests that they also did not consider this narration as authentic. On the other hand, the fact that all narrations transmitted in these books are not compatible with those authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) hadiths about the emergence of tashahhud, which were reported by muhaddiths, such as Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, Nasāī and Ibn Mājah. This also indicates another problem with this narration. The authentic hadiths on the issue as follows: 1. Bukhārī→Musaddad→Yaḥyā→Aʿmash→Shaqīq→Ibn Masʿūd: He said:When we prayed with the Messenger of Allāh (pbuh), we used to say: “Peace (al-Salām) be upon Allāh, peace be upon Jibrīl, peace be upon Mikāʿīl.” The Messenger of Allāh (pbuh) said: “Do not say: Peace (al-Salām) be upon Allāh, for Allāh is al-Salām.” Rather say: “al-taḥiyyātu lillāhi wa-al-salawātu wa-al-ṭayyibāt, al-salāmu ʿalayka ayyuhan-Nabiyyu wa-raḥmatallāhi wa-barakātuhu. Al-salāmu ʿalayna wa-ʿalā ʿibād Allāh al-ṣāliḥīn, ashhadu an lā ilāha illallāh wa-ashhadu anna Muḥammadan ʿabduhu wa-rasūluhu (Allāh compliments, prayers and pure words are due to Allāh. Peace be upon you, O Prophet, and the mercy of Allāh and his blessings. Peace be upon us and upon the righteous slaves of Allāh. I bear witness that none has the right to be worshipped except Allāh and I bear witness that Muḥammad is His slave and Messenger.”2. Bukhārī→Abū Nuaym→Sayf→Mucāhid→Abū Maʿmar ʿAbdullāh b. Saḥbarah→Ibn Masʿūd: He said:Allāh’s Messenger (pbuh) taught me Tashahhud as he taught me a sūrah (chapter) from the Qur’ān, while my hand was between his hands. (Tashahhud was): “All the best compliments and the prayers and the good things are for Allāh. Peace and Allāh’s Mercy and Blessings be on you, O Prophet! Peace be on us and on the pious slaves of Allāh, I testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allāh, and I also testify that Muhammad is Allāh’s slave and His Apostle.” (We used to recite this in the prayer) during the lifetime of the Prophet (pbuh), but when he had died, we used to say: “Peace be on the Prophet.”As a result, it is unlikely that the Prophet (pbuh) did not touch upon the relationship between the Miʿrāj and the Tashahhud while teaching it. It is also unlikely that his companions who narrated this occasion did not mention about this important detail although they had such knowledge. Indeed, hadith scholars did not include the narrations that associated tashahhud with the Miʿrāj but they reported two other aforementioned narrations on the emergence of the Tashahhud in their books, which raises doubts over the authenticity of the relevant narration in question. (shrink)

Denne artikel hedder ”Musikalske Omgangsformer”. Men den fortæller ikke så meget om, hvorledes musikalske omgangsformer tager sig ud, som den fører til et punkt, hvor musikalske omgangsformer bliver sigtbare og påtrængende. Snarere end at præsentere en teori om musikalske omgangsformer anviser den et sted, hvor en teoridannelse er påkrævet. Udgangspunktet bliver en påvisning af, hvorledes den fænomenologiske tilgang til det musikalske fænomen svigter ved tematisk og dog stiltiende at hævde musikstykket, satsen, som sin genstand. Utilstrækkeligheden påpeges inden for den fænomenologiske (...) analyses eget univers. Som sådan vil den ved artiklens afslutning yderligere omfatte formuleringen af den påpegede utilstrækkelighed. Fra dette – negative – udgangspunkt tages skridtet ind i et rum, der skal indbefatte de påviste løse ender og samtidig give plads for, at vi med positivt udgangspunkt i en praxis-orienteret filosofi kan komme til at binde de nødvendige knuder. (shrink)

We say that each social group is identical to its members. The group just is them; they just are the group. This view of groups as pluralities has tended to be swiftly rejected by social metaphysicians, if considered at all, mainly on the basis of two objections. First, it is argued that groups can change in membership, while pluralities cannot. Second, it is argued that different groups can have exactly the same members, while different pluralities cannot. We rebut these objections, (...) and argue that our plural view is superior to alternative reductive proposals which would identify social groups with the sets or fusions of their members. Finally we deal with some further potential challenges for the view of groups as pluralities. Thus we aim to establish it as a serious contender in the metaphysics of groups. (shrink)

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that socially significant places such as countries, cities and establishments are immaterial objects, despite their being spatially located. In contrast, we aim to defend a reductive materialist view of such entities, which identifies them with their physical territories or premises. Accordingly, these are all material objects; typically, aggregates of land and infrastructure. Admittedly, our terms for these entities may also sometimes be used to denote their associated groups of people. But as long as countries, cities and (...) establishments are understood as places, we submit, they are all material objects: the physical territories or premises of their associated groups. (shrink)

Tesis doctoral presentada en el departament de Lògica Història i Filosofia de la Ciencia de la Universitat de Barcelona per optar al títol de Doctor en Filosofia.

My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modeled as a propositional function, that is, (...) the content of a complex predicate that is true or false only relative to some circumstances of evaluation. (shrink)

In this article I argue not only for the value of hermeneutics today but also, and especially, how the crucial gesture of hermeneutics is that of changing the subject for the sake of our today. Surveying briefly the main lines of hermeneutical positions along its history and critiques, and connecting these critiques to the discrepancy between theory and practice, between interpretation and the need to change the world, the article proposes that our reality today, reshaped through globalization and the virtual, (...) is performed as a hermeneutics of history. The challenge for today’s hermeneutics is to work out categories for understanding the present as on-going in a world that tends to capture and distort more and more the meaning of freedom of thought. In the final section, I propose a hermeneutics of the on-going, of gerundive time, partially under the inspiration of Paul Celan, as a response that develops the meaning of the freedom of thought. A defense of nearness and how to think in narrow nearness to the on-going is discussed. (shrink)

Charlotte Witt has argued that gender is essential to women and men, in a way that unifies them as social individuals but precludes each of them from being identified with the corresponding person or human organism. We respond to Witt’s modal and normative arguments for this view, and we argue that they fail to support anything stronger than a moderate version of kind essentialism, which generally allows women and men to be identified with people. We finish by pointing out that (...) several of Witt’s central claims about gender roles and gender norms could be endorsed while rejecting her ontology of coincident individuals. (shrink)

Sahih al-Bukhari, one of the most esteemed and widely studied collections of hadith by Muslims, has garnered significant attention in Indonesia. This paper delves into the history of Sahih al-Bukhari's study within the Indonesian context, examining its transmission lineage, vernacularization, and study methodologies in traditional and contemporary educational context. Three specific objectives were pursued: 1) the translation and vernacularization of Sahih al-Bukhari, 2) the transmission of Sahih al-Bukhari, with a focus on Indonesian pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), and 3) the analysis (...) of Sahih al-Bukhari study methods within Islamic colleges. Employing a historical method and an analytical approach, this research underscores the importance of translating and rendering Sahih al-Bukhari into vernacular languages as an initial step in making this revered text accessible. The study forms and institutions involved in Sahih al-Bukhari education were categorized into two primary streams: pesantren and Islamic higher education institutions. While pesantren encompass introductory courses, memorization programs, and more practical approaches, Islamic higher education institutions offer diverse and contemporary methods, including thematic, comparative, critical, living, and understanding studies. This study provides a comprehensive exploration of the multifaceted nature of Sahih al-Bukhari studies in Indonesia. By investigating its historical development, translation efforts, and the unique study methodologies within different educational settings, it sheds light on the diverse ways in which Sahih al-Bukhari is approached and understood in the Indonesian context. (shrink)

Th e simple proposal about rigidity for predicates can be stated thus: a predicate is rigid if its canonical nominalization signifi es the same property across the different possible worlds. I have tried elsewhere to defend such a proposal from the trivialization problem, according to which any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be rigid. Benjamin Schnieder (2005) aims fi rst to rebut my argument that some canonical nominalizations can be fl exible, then to provide fi ve arguments to the (...) eff ect that they are all rigid, and fi nally to propose a general explanation of why they are all rigid. I show fi rst why my argument has not been rebutted, then why Schnieder’s fi ve arguments for their rigidity all fail, and fi nally why the alleged “explanation” cannot be such, as the facts alluded to are neutral with respect to the rigidity or fl exibility of the nominalizations. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new reading of transcendental idealism. For a start, I endorse Allison’s rejection of the traditional so-called two-world view and, hence, of Guyer and Van Cleve’s ontological phenomenalism. But following Allais, I also reject Allison’s metaphysical deflacionism: transcendental idealism is metaphysically committed to the existence of things in themselves, noumena in the negative sense. Nevertheless, in opposition to Allais, I take Kant’s claim that appearances are “mere representations” inside our minds seriously. In the empirical sense, (...) appearances are the undetermined object of our sensible intuition. Yet, in the transcendental sense, appearances are nothing but the mind-dependent way that noumena manifest inside our minds and, hence, our mind-dependent way of knowing the mind-independent reality in itself (epistemological phenomenalism). (shrink)

Resumo: O projeto semântico de Davidson toma a forma de reducionismo que visa explicar as noções intencionais com base em noções puramente extensionais. O objetivo desse trabalho consiste na investigação do fracasso do projeto de Davidson como um argumento indireto contra sua suposição segundo a qual a chamada interpretação radical seria o fundamento do significado linguístico e do pensamento. Abstract: Davidson's semantic program is a form of semantic reductionism that aims to account for intensional notions on a purely extensional basis. (...) My aim in this paper is not to show that Davidsons fails in addressing the so-called extensionality problem. That is no novelty. Even Davidsonians recognize Davidson's failure. My main goal is to explore Davidson's failure as an indirect argument against his key assumption that the radical interpretation is the basis of sense and hence the possibility of thought. There is no priority of language over thought. This is a remnant of the so-called linguistic turn that Davidson inherited from the analytical tradition. The moral is the following: we must come back to Lockean common sense that to learn a natural language and to translate an alien tongue into our own is merely to learn a vehicle for communicating and expressing thoughts we have already had. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a new solution to Mary’s puzzle in Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. We are told that imprisoned Mary knows all facts or truths about color and color vision. On her release, she learns something new according to B-type of materialism and according to property dualism. I argue that this cognitive improvement can only be accounted for in terms of what Schellenberg has recently called “capacitism,” namely the claim that that experience is constitutively a matter of (...) discriminating and singling out particulars by employing perceptual capacities. Of course, I am not claiming that knowing the phenomenal character is simply the possession of abilities, let alone that the phenomenal character is a sort of know-how. That is why my claim is not affiliated with Lewis and Nemirow's ability hypothesis position. I take for granted here a sort of property-representationalism, according to which the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on the cluster of properties that the respective experiences represent. On her release, Mary acquires those perceptual abilities on the basis of which she learns to discriminate all shades of color. And after applying her old physical concept RED to the shade of red, she comes to know what it is like to experience red (propositional knowledge). (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo analisa a composição étnico-racial dos programas de pós-graduação brasileiros da área de filosofia. O propósito é identificar as características gerais da área e analisar os dados disponíveis sobre as declarações de cor/raça em seus mestrados e doutorados. Espera-se que essas análises sejam úteis para a discussão e proposição de ações afirmativas em tais programas. O resultado obtido evidenciou que negros estão largamente sub-representados na pós-graduação em filosofia. Com efeito, a área é atualmente entre as humanidades a (...) de maior concentração de estudantes declarados brancos. Isto posto, o estudo especula possíveis causas e consequências dessa situação, procurando encontrar caminhos para o enfrentamento efetivo do racismo acadêmico. Palavras-chave: Desigualdades Raciais; Perfil Discente; Racismo Acadêmico. Black People in Philosophy Graduate Programs in Brazil Abstract: The present paper analyzes the ethnic-racial composition of Brazilian graduate programs in the field of philosophy. Its purpose is to identify the general characteristics of the field, and to analyze the available data on color/race in its master’s and doctoral programs. It is hoped that these analyzes will be useful for the discussion and proposition of affirmative actions in such programs. The result obtained showed that blacks are largely underrepresented in Brazilian philosophy graduate schools. Indeed, the field is currently the one with the highest concentration of students declared to be white among all the human sciences in Brazil. With that being said, the study speculates on possible causes and consequences of that situation, seeking to find ways to effectively confront academic racism. Keywords: Racial Inequalities; Student Profile; Academic Racism. Schwarze Menschen an Graduiertenprogrammen für Philosophie in Brasilien Zusammenfassung: Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die ethnisch-rassische Zusammensetzung brasilianischer Graduiertenprogramme im Bereich Philosophie. Sein Zweck ist es, die allgemeinen Merkmale des Fachgebiets zu identifizieren und die verfügbaren Daten zu Farbe/Rasse in seinen Master- und Doktoratsprogrammen zu analysieren. Es ist zu hoffen, dass diese Analysen für die Diskussion und den Vorschlag von Maßnahmen positiver Diskriminierung in solchen Programmen nützlich sein werden. Das hier erreichte Ergebnis zeigte, dass Schwarze in den brasilianischen Graduiertenkollegs stark unterrepräsentiert sind. In der Tat ist das Fachgebiet derzeit dasjenige unter allen Humanwissenschaften in Brasilien mit der höchsten Konzentration von Studenten, die als weiß deklariert werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund spekuliert diese Studie über mögliche Ursachen und Folgen dieser Situation und versucht, Wege zu finden, um akademischem Rassismus wirksam entgegenzutreten. Schlüsselwörter: Rassenungleichheiten; Studierendenprofil; Akademischer Rassismus. Data de registro: 16/06/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

According to Papineau’s qualitative view, experiences instantiate both representational and phenomenal properties. The instantiation of phenomenal properties is people undergoing the relevant experience. In contrast, the instantiation of representational properties relies on changing relationships between the person and the environment in which the person is embedded. The upshot is that phenomenal and representational properties are only contingently related: phenomenal properties are neither identical to, nor supervene on, representational properties. In this article, the author gives a detailed criticism of Papineau’s qualitative (...) view. Papineau’s qualitative view left unexplained the relevant causal role of consciousness in accounting for actions—assuming that a mental state only becomes conscious when it is poised to make a direct difference to what the subject believes and later remembers, how the subject reasons, what decisions the subject makes, and what rational actions the subject performs. The author argues that the same reasons that support Papineau’s complaint that it is hard to see how distal particulars and properties make their way into the realm of consciousness—namely some traditional arguments against representationalism—also show that it is hard to see how phenomenal consciousness makes its way back into the outside world in explaining the rational control of actions. (shrink)

The article engages with feminist care theories and practices of community building in the context of armed conflict. Based on an ethnographic study of the security concerns of Israeli citizens living in the Gaza Envelope and their positions regarding the siege on Gaza, we find that in this region, vernacular security is closely linked with care, social reproduction and communitarianism. Communitarian ethics is intertwined with separatist, state-centred discourses on national ‘trauma and resilience’. In this context, Jewish-Israeli women care for their (...) own communities as a way to ensure survival and civilian resilience. They generally disengage from moral dilemmas concerning the suffering of Palestinians. On a deeper level, the practice of security as care combines the hegemonic Israeli security paradigm of women’s soldierhood with an institutional and cultural obsession with trauma-oriented activities. Showing strong ethno-nationalist identifications, these women tend to overlook and even support the state’s violent siege on Gaza, which is seen as a zero-sum game. We conclude that the gendered dimensions of communitarian ethics in Israel are relevant for understanding the limitations and challenges of contemporary cosmopolitan feminism and a global politics of care. (shrink)

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith , “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive (...) similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

Response to Max Kölbel: "A Criterion for Objectivity", Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2.

Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...) case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention. (shrink)

The seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic requires a look into the implementation of drug registration rules for COVID-19 vaccines. Amidst the surrounding exigencies, vaccines being a biological product, require comprehensive and continuing pre and post registration rules to ensure their safety and efficacy. The study focuses on Malaysia which has rules on drug registration that have been successfully applied to vaccines. The study shows that the rules have been tailor-made to emergency situations. At the moment, special rules have been introduced (...) including to allow use of COVID-19 vaccines as unregistered product. Recognition of COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) facility and requirement for government sale only, are among the safety valves. The study shows that these however are temporary measures against the backdrops of possible entry of private players in the vaccination process. Therefore, regulatory responses to intellectual property (IP) related conditions underlying drug registration, and measures to ensure risk management involved in vaccine production, approval and administration are needed in the progressive rules pending further development of research in the area. (shrink)

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent. 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the (...) conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs. (shrink)